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Abstract  [229 words] 
 
This article undertakes analysis of misuse of private information (MPI) case law informed by 
deconstruction and wider literary and critical theory. It specifically considers the operation 
of the µEDODQFH¶metaphor in MPI case law: What rhetorical effects might it foster, and how? 
What insights can the balance metaphor in MPI case law reveal about the nature of legal 
discourse more generally?  This article starts by providing an account of select theorists who 
explore the subtle but vital role that metaphor plays in non-literary texts.  Though metaphors 
have traditionally been viewed as poetic or literary devices, deconstruction indicates that 
they often exert a hidden influence in the texts of other disciplines such as philosophy and 
law, with inevitable implications for claims based on truth, objectivity and reason. This 
account ultimately highlights the fundamental - but often overlooked - role of metaphor in 
legal discourse.  Following this discussion, the article proceeds to investigate the key 
µEDODQFH¶ metaphor in misuse of private information judgments.  It identifies and analyses 
two distinct ways in which the balance metaphor subtly benefits and supports judicial 
reasoning in these judgments.  First, it creates an impression of certainty by drawing on 
connotations of the quantifiable and calculable.  Second, it fosters the moral appeal of a 
decision by alluding to notions of justice and equilibrium.  In doing so, the balance metaphor 
marginalises the non-rational, inexpressible, even mysterious, aspects of judicial rights 
balancing.  
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³In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigorous search of Truth, 
-XGJHPHQW GRHV DOO « %XW IRU 0HWDSKRUV WKH\ DUH LQ WKLV FDVH
utterly excluded.  For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit 
them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly.´ 
 
T Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch 8 (1651) 
 
 
 
³What then is truth?  a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthromorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were 
poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, 
and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. 
Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are 
illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which 
have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no 
longer as coins´  
  
F Nietzsche, µ2Q7UXWKDQG/LHs in an Extra-0RUDO6HQVH¶ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Lawyers, like poets, are no strangers to metaphor.  For example, legal discourse has adopted the 
notion of µripeness¶ IRU MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ,1 likened property rights to µEXQGOHV RI VWLFNV¶,2 excluded 
evidence as the µIUXLWRI WKHSRLVRQRXVWUHH,3 implicitly condemned FODLPDQWV¶ µfishing H[SHGLWLRQV¶4 
and retained Lockean agrarian imagery in copyright.5  Law then, it seems, has its very own mobile 
army of metaphors.  This article is concerned with one particular metaphor WKDWRI µEDODQFH¶.  The 
notion of balance is widely used within, and long associated with, law; in particular it constitutes µone 
of the central features of postwar Western legal thought and practice¶.6  This article focuses on the 
role RIWKHµEDODQFH¶PHWDSKRULQ the specific context of misuse of private information jurisprudence.  
 
Misuse of private information (MPI) is a relatively new doctrine that has emerged from a series of 
post-Human Rights Act 1998 legal disputes, many involving high profile claimants seeking to restrain 
                                                          
1
 -DPHV(0XUUD\µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ/DZDV0HWDSKRU¶-/HJDO(GXF-22. 
2
 7KRPDV5RVVµ0HWDSKRUDQG3DUDGR[¶*HRUJLD/DZ5HYLHZ-1063. 
3
 ibid, 1067-1069 
4
 (OL]DEHWK*7KRUQEXUJµ-XVW6D\µ1R)LVKLQJ¶7KH/XUHRI0HWDSKRU¶8QLYHUVLW\RI0LFKLJDQ-RXUQDO
of Law Reform vol 40(1) 1.  
5
 :LOOLDP 3DWU\ µ0HWDSKRUV DQG 0RUDO 3DQLFV LQ &RS\ULJKW WKH 6WHSKHQ 6WHZDUW 0HPRULDO /HFWXUH¶ >@
I.P.Q. 1, 1-13, 8-10. 
6
 Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights, The Origins & Meanings of Postwar Legal Discourse (2013, 
Cambridge University Press) 1. 
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publication of personal information by tabloid defendants.7  The core RI WKHDFWLRQ LVDQ µinterright 
FRQIOLFW¶8 between the Article 8 right of privacy9 and the Article 10 right to free expression,10 and to 
manage this conflict judges have created the µbalancing exercise¶.  Elsewhere, the author has 
undertaken deconstructive analysis of this binary opposition, examining how Articles 8 and 10 and 
WKHLU SULPDU\ XQGHUO\LQJ GLFKRWRP\ µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ versus µLQWHUHVWLQJ WKH SXEOLF¶ DUH LQ VRPH
senses reversible, mutually reliant and not entirely distinct.11  That analysis revealed some of the 
culturally specific assumptions that silently shape understandings of the public interest dichotomy, 
including Enlightenment-era ideals of intellectual debate, objective truth and democratic participation 
and the related privileging of political over non-political speech, the serious over the trivial etc.  It 
also found that the QRWLRQRIWKHµSXEOLF¶across MPI discourse is subject to varying constructions for 
rhetorical ends, shifting from empowered consumers to politically engaged citizens to the voyeuristic 
masses according to speaker, agenda and context.  However, another strand of deconstructive thought 
has further insights to reveal in this area, namely its concern with the role of metaphor in discourse.   
 
This article undertakes analysis of MPI caselaw informed by deconstruction and wider literary and 
critical theory.  First, it provides an account of select theorists who explore the subtle but vital role 
that metaphor plays in non-literary texts.  It pays particular DWWHQWLRQWR'HUULGD¶VZRUN on metaphor, 
though academic interest in metaphor extends far beyond deconstruction.  This discussion of the 
shared origins and history of metaphor and rhetoric is valuable here for three reasons.  First it 
highlights the various hierarchies operative across political-philosophical history; hierarchies that 
remain influential, particularly in law and therefore MPI specifically.  Second it shows that 
metaphors, often hidden, play a rhetorical role in  discourses such as philosophy or science, with 
inevitable implications for claims based on truth, objectivity and reason.  Third it demonstrates the 
crucial role of metaphors in legal discourse generally, and the role of such metaphors in constituting 
and shaping our experiences.   The second part of this article proceeds to investigate the use of 
µEDODQFH¶DVDPHWDSKRULQ03,MXGJPHQWV,WFRQVLGHUVWKHUKHWRULFDOHIIHFWRIWKHrights-µweighting¶ 
process, asking what underlying subjectivities such metaphors might betray, what rhetorically 
beneficial assumptions they might engender. 
 
 
                                                          
7
 5HEHFFD0RRVDYLDQµ&KDUWLQJWKH-RXUQH\IURP&RQILGHQFHWRWKH1HZ0HWKRGRORJ\¶(,35>@
324-335. 
8
 -HUHP\:DOGURQµ5LJKWVLQ&RQIOLFW¶(WKLFV 99 (April 1989): 503-519, p. 514. 
9
 $UWLFOH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV	)XQGDPHQWDO)UHHGRPV$UWVWDWHVµEveryone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence¶ 
10
 Article 10, European Convention on Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms 1950.  Art 10(1) states: 
µEveryone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers¶ 
11
 5HEHFFD 0RRVDYLDQ µ'HFRQVWUXFWLQJ ³3XEOLF ,QWHUHVW´ LQ WKH $UWLFOH  YV $UWLFOH  %DODQFLQJ ([HUFLVH¶ 
[2014] Journal of Media Law, Vol 6(2), 234-268. 
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[1] Metaphor, Rhetoric & Law 
 
 
A metaphor is form of trope, the essence of which entails µunderstanding and experiencing one kind 
of thing in terms of another¶.12  It is a device whereby a speaker refers to two different things at once, 
e.g. by a drawing a comparison, link or substituting one term for another, the second term being 
redeployed in a different context.  In doing so metaphor draws upon similarities or resemblance 
between the two things.  Metaphor has been traditionally viewed as a figurative or poetic form of 
expression, as distinct from literal, descriptive speech.  Unlike the latter, it entails an open-ended form 
RIFRPPXQLFDWLRQµSUHJQDQW¶ with meaning and mystery, drawing links across contexts.  Metaphors 
are seen as non-rational, appealing to the senses (especially visual senses) and playing on emotional 
responses.  One such example is provided in the seminal Illness as Metaphor, where Sontag critiques 
the various metaphors that recur in literary depictions of cancer and tuberculosis.13  She analyses 
FDQFHU¶s portrayal as a parasite and a form of contamination, and WKH µODQJXDJH RI ZDUIDUH¶14 with 
which it is depicted.  For Sontag, such imagery cumulatively instils undue fear and dread regarding 
the disease and is thus ultimately misleading.  Despite this (or perhaps because of it) cancer comes to 
be adopted in turn as a metaphor in other disciplines.  For example, in a political context cancer is a 
µVSHFLILFDOO\SROHPLFDO¶GLVHDVH;15 describing an issue as a social cancer highlights the severity of the 
matter, raises the stakes and justifies drastic measures.16   
 
[1.1] Classical Views of Rhetoric & Metaphor 
 
The origins and characteristics of metaphor are closely entwined with that of rhetoric.  Rhetoric, the 
art of using language to persuade an audience of a particular position, emerged to prominence with the 
sophists in classical Greek culture.  Metaphor was viewed as a rhetorical device which could aid 
persuasion.  Successful participation in the Athenian democratic system necessitated skills of 
persuasion on the political stage and particularly in the law courts.17  The origins of rhetoric are thus 
at least partly legal.   
 
Plato was highly critical of rhetoric as a practice18 and denounced it in two of his dialogues 
Phaedrus19 and Gorgias.20  In the latter Plato condemned rhetoric as a mere knack or technique,21 a 
                                                          
12
 George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (2003, University of Chicago Press) 5. 
13
 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor & AIDS and its Metaphors (Penguin, 2002).   
14
 ibid 65.  See also: 59; 86. 
15
 ibid 74.  See also 86. 
16
 ibid ch 9; 82-3; 84. 
17
 See HC Lawson-Tancred, Introduction in Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (Penguin Classics 2004) 8-14. 
18
 This is linked to his hostility to the democratic system: Plato, Republic (Oxford 1998) 555b-562a. 
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form of flattery22 that panders to the desire of its audience23 and requires no specific expertise.24  
Instead it forms µD SKDQWRP EUDQFK RI VWDWHVPDQVKLS¶.25  Plato depicted rhetoric as inferior and 
opposed to philosophy in numerous respects.  For example, rhetoric is concerned with attaining 
successful outcomes rather than engendering moral virtue;26 it involves persuasion27 rather than 
education,28 manipulating29 audiences in disregard of the truth.30  Woven throughout 3ODWR¶VDFFRXQW
of rhetoric is a cynicism about the motives of rhetoricians and the capacities of their audiences,31 a 
dynamic incidentally replicated in judicial understandings of the tabloid press and its readers.32  
 
Aristotle also made a significant early contribution to the area, creating The Art of Rhetoric, a manual 
for effective speech.  This aimed to put the practice of rhetoric on a more systematic, philosophical 
footing by attempting to organise discourse into a series of topics.  1RQHWKHOHVV$ULVWRWOH¶VSURMHFW
still rested upon an implicit distinction between analytics and rhetoric.33  Aristotle categorised rhetoric 
as either deliberative (political),34 forensic (legal)35 or display.  Each was directed to a particular 
audience36 with the objective of µEULQJLQJWKHJLYHURIMXGJHPHQWLQWRDFHUWDLQFRQGLWLRQ¶.37  Aristotle 
made a significant distinction between deliberative and forensic (political and legal) oratory; the latter 
UHTXLUHVJUHDWHUDFFXUDF\SUHFLVLRQDQGRQO\µWKHVPDOOHVWDPRXQWRIUKHWRULF¶EHFDXVHWKHMXGJPHQWLW
DSSHDOVWRLVµSXUH¶38  For Aristotle rhetoric is not inherently opposed to truth, but could be used to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19
 Plato, Phaedrus (Oxford 2009). 
20
 Plato, Gorgias (Oxford 2008).  For an illuminating reading of Gorgias see: James Boyd White, When Words 
Lose their Meaning, Constitutions & Reconstitutions of Language, Character & Community (University of 
Chicago Press 1984) ch 4. 
21
 Gorgias (n 20) 462c. 
22
 ibid 463a-b; 466a.   
23
 Socrates: µ>)ODWWHU\@LVQ¶WLQWHUHVWHGLQWKH slightest in the best course of action, but she traps and deceives 
foolish people with the promise of maximising immediate pleasure, which makes her seem better than any 
alternative¶Ibid 464c-d.  See also: 502e; 518e-519a. 
24
 ibid 459a-c; 462b.  See also: Phaedrus (n 19) 206a; 206c. 
25
 Gorgias (n 20) 463d. 
26
 ibid 506c-507e; 515a; 517b-c. 
27
 *RUJLDV µ,¶P WDONLQJDERXW WKHDELOLW\ WRXVH WKH VSRNHQZRUG WRSHUVXDGH ± to persuade the jurors in the 
courts, the members of the Council, the citizens attending the Assembly ± in short, to win over any and every 
form of public meeting in the citizen body.¶ibid 452e-453a. 
28
 6RFUDWHVµ$UKHWRULFLDQWKHQLVQ¶WFRQFHUQHGWRHGXFDWHWKHSHRSOHDVVHPEOHGLQODZFRXUWVDQGVRRQDERXW
right and wrong; all he wants to do is persuade them¶ibid 455a.  See also: 454d-455a. 
29
 Phaedrus (n 19) 267c-268a.  On the ethics of persuasion see also:  James Boyd White, +HUDFOHV¶%RZ(VVD\V
on Rhetoric & the Poetics of the Law (University of Wisconsin Press 1985) ch 1. 
30
 Gorgias (n 20) 521d-e; 526b-e. See also Phaedrus (n 18) 272e-273b. 
31
 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally, Clarendon Press, 1989, 473 
32
 Moosavian (n 11) 250-255. 
33
 )RUDQDFFRXQWRI$ULVWRWOH¶VUKHWRULFVHH3HWHU*RRGULFKµ5KHWRULFDV-XULVSUXGHQFH$Q Introduction to the 
3ROLWLFVRI/HJDO/DQJXDJH¶2-/6 (1984) Vol 4, No 1, 88, 100-105.     
34
 Aristotle (n 17) ch 1.4. 
35
 ibid ch 1.10. 
36
 ibid ch 1.3 
37
 ibid 1377b 
38
 ibid 1414a. 
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serve truth by mobilising audience support for it.39  Rhetoric offered general guidance on matters such 
as understanding the character of an audience,40 adopting a suitable style41 and instilling appropriate 
emotion in speech.42  Drawing upon his earlier work in Poetics,43 Aristotle provided some discussion 
of metaphor as an ornamental, stylistic device and made recommendations for its use in rhetorical 
speech.44  He viewed simile and metaphor as a fundamental aspect of style and, crucially, linked their 
use to a general psychology.  The power of metaphor rests µRQWKHFKDUPRI unfamiliarLW\¶45 and to be 
effective metaphors must be used clearly and proportionately.46  Goodrich summarises $ULVWRWOH¶V
view of metaphor thus: ³Just as rhetoric is less than philosophy, so too metaphor is less than truth.  
Metaphor may be persuasive, pleasurable or pleonastic but it will seldom be necessary´.47   
 
It is apparent from the preceding account that, as Fish argues, the classical philosophy/rhetoric divide 
is pervaded by a number of implicit (but contestable) hierarchies such as deep/surface, reason/passion, 
reality/illusion, fact/opinion and neutral/partisan.48  Fish traces how the classic opposition rests on an 
innate privileging of apparently accurate, factual, transparent language over partisan, distorting, 
fictional language.49  This classical suspicion of rhetoric and its associated qualities has remained 
influential.  Goodrich charts the historical decline of rhetoric and its subordination to logic50 and later 
Enlightenment-era empiricist, rationalist philosophies.51  He shows how rhetoric has been consistently 
PDUJLQDOLVHGRUGLVPLVVHGDVWULYLDOFODLPLQJLWEHFDPHµthe other of philosophy¶52  Fish also shows 
how such oppositions have recurred across history in various guises,53 spanning many disciplines, 
including law.54  For example, a literal/metaphorical language divide informs criticisms of metaphor 
                                                          
39
 ibid 1355a.   
40
 ibid chs 2.12-2.17. 
41
 µExperts in these [style and delivery] more or less carry off the prizes at the contests, and just as in the case of 
the tragedy actors now have more effect than the poets, so is it also in political contests, through the baseness 
of the citizenry¶ibid 1403b. 
42
 ibid ch 2.1. 
43
 Aristotle, Poetics (Penguin, 1996), ch 21, ch 25. 
44
 )RUDQDFFRXQWRI$ULVWRWOH¶VPHWDSKRUVHHGoodrich (n 33) 106-7.  Interesting discussion can also be found 
in: -DFTXHV 'HUULGD µ:KLWH 0\WKRORJ\ 0HWDSKRU LQ WKH 7H[W RI 3KLORVRSK\¶ LQ Margins of Philosophy 
(University of Chicago Press, 1984) 230-245; Paul Ricoeur, The Rule of Metaphor (2003, Routledge 
Classics) Study 1, 
45
 µ7KHUH OLHV EHKLQG $ULVWRWOH¶V ZKROH DFFRXQW RI VW\OH WKH XQDUJXHG DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW WKH HVVHQFH RI OLWHUDU\
pleasure is the combination of WKHIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHH[RWLF¶.  HC Lawson-Tancred (n 17) 40.  See also 42. 
46
 ibid ch 3.2.   
47
 Goodrich (n 33) 107.   
48
 Fish (n 31) 474. 
49
 ibid 474-5; 482-5. 
50
 Peter Goodrich, µLaw & Language: An Historical and Critical Introduction¶, Journal of Law & Society (1984) 
vol 11(2), 173, 177; Goodrich (n 33) 100-104. 
51
 Goodrich (n 33) 90. 
52
 ibid 108.   
53
 Fish (n 31) 478.    
54
 ibid 474-5; 482-)RUDQH[DPSOHRIWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQLQODZVHHHJ3LHUUH1/HYDOµ-XGLFLDO2SLQLRQVDV
/LWHUDWXUH¶ LQ 3HWHU %URRNV & Paul Gewirtz (eds), /DZ¶V 6WRULHV 1Drrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Yale 
University Press 1996).  Here Justice Leval claims that literary devices in law have the potential for harm and 
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as deceitful and dangerous in the works of thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham and Kant.  As 
/DNRIIDQG-RKQVRQFODLPµThe fear of metaphor and rhetoric in the empiricist tradition is a fear of 
subjectivism ± a fear of emotion and the imagination¶55 
 
[1.2] Deconstruction & Metaphor 
 
Deconstruction brought into question many of the assumptions of the classical philosophies outlined 
above.  In general terms the deconstructive method of textual analysis entails drawing out multiple 
meanings, ambiguities and veiled ideologies.56  Deconstructive strategies include an interest in 
metaphor which had been traditionally viewed as a literary or fictional device.  Yet Derrida focussed 
on the silent role of metaphor in philosophy; despite its claims to be a discipline based on reason and 
concerned with seeking higher truths, many leading texts were based on disguised metaphorical 
devices.   The precursor to such deconstructive strategies is present in the work of Nietzsche, who 
claimed that human certainty rested on forgetting LWVRULJLQVLQWKHµSULPLWLYHPHWDSKRU-ZRUOG¶57  For 
Nietzsche: 
 
 ³the origin of language is not a logical process, and the whole material in 
and with which the man of truth, the scientist, the philosopher [and, one 
might add, the lawyer] works and builds, stems, if not from a never-never 
land, in any case not from the essence of things´58   
 
In White Mythology59 Derrida continued this theme, highlighting the various ways in which metaphor 
is central to philosophical language.  Derrida questioned whether philosophy can ever purge itself of 
metaphorical language, and indeed whether its leading metaphors can be identified in the first place.  
The very distinction between philosophy and literature itself rests on metaphor, and such metaphors 
can only be explained in metaphorical terms.60  Derrida explained this circularity in the following 
terms:   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
GHFHSWLRQWKDWUKHWRULFµVHGXFHVWKHVSHDNHUDVZHOODVWKHDXGLHQFH¶DQGVDFULILFHVFODULW\IRUSRZHUDW207-8, 
210. 
55
 Lakoff & Johnson (n 12) 191 
56
 I have provided an account of deconstruction elsewhere: (n 11). 
57
 ) 1LHW]VFKH µ2Q 7UXWK 	 /\LQJ LQ DQ ([WUD-0RUDO 6HQVH ¶ LQ Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric & 
Language (Oxford, 1989) 246-257, at 252. 
58
 [My addition].  ibid 249. 
59
 Derrida (n 44).   
60
 )RUH[DPSOH'HUULGDQRWHVWKHWH[WVRIµ5HQDQ1LHW]VFKH«)UHXG%HUJVRQDQG/HQLQDOORIZKRPLQWKHLU
attentiveness to metaphorical activity in theoretical or philosophical discourse, proposed or practiced the 
multiplication of antagonistic metaphors in order better to control or neutralize their effect¶ibid 214.  See 
also: Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction, 25th Anniversary Edition (Routledge 2008) 147; Anthony 
5H\QROGVµ7KH$IWHUOLIHRI'HDG0HWDSKRUV2Q'HUULGD¶V3UDJPDWLVP¶5HYLVWDGH/HWUDV9RO
181-195, 184-5. 
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³The appeal to criteria of clarity and obscurity [of language] would suffice 
WR FRQILUP « WKLV HQWLUH SKLORVRSKLFDO GHOLPLWDWLRQ RI PHWDSKRU DOUHDG\
lends itself WREHLQJFRQVWUXFWHGDQGZRUNHGE\µPHWDSKRUV¶+RZFRXOGD
piece of knowledge or a language be properly clear or obscure?  Now, all 
the concepts which have operated in the definition of metaphor always have 
DQRULJLQDQGDQHIILFDFLW\WKDWDUHWKHPVHOYHVµPHWDSKRULFDO¶ ´.61 
 
To acknowledge this casts doubt on whether philosophical language can objectively and accurately 
represent the nature of things.  Indeed Derrida suggested that such an enterprise is impossible because, 
as Harrison explains, µthe metaphysician, to say what he wants to say, needs to view matters from a 
standpoint outside language, a standpoint in principle inaccessible to him¶62  Influenced by Derrida, 
De Man also analysed metaphor to question the broad philosophy-literature divide, claiming that:  
 
³All philosophy is condemned, to the extent that it is dependent on 
figuration, to be literary and, as the depository of this very problem, all 
literature is to some extent philosophical´63 
 
In 3ODWR¶V3KDUPDF\ Derrida XQGHUWDNHVDQDO\VLVRI3ODWR¶VPHGLFLQHPHWDSKRUE\ deconstructing the 
sign µSKDUPDNRQ¶ DV XVHG LQ the dialogue, Phaedrus.  The dialogue depicts a discussion between 
Socrates and Phaedrus about the nature of writing.  Throughout the text writing is referred to as 
µSKDUPDNRQ¶D*UHHNZRUGZLWKDGXDOPHDQLQJRIERWKµUHPHG\¶DQGµSRLVRQ¶64 [thus] a term with a 
reversible and ambiguous structure.65  Derrida traces silent, unwitting shifts in the meaning of 
µSKDUPDNRQ¶66 FODLPLQJ WKDW 3ODWR¶V WH[W µPDQLIHVWV D VHULHV RI VOLGLQJV « WKDW DUH KLJKO\
VLJQLILFDQW¶67  7KH VLJQ µSKDUPDNRQ¶ LV XVHG WR FRQWDLQ a selection of oppositions,68 the most 
significant of which is that between speech (logos) over writing, a privileging seen throughout 
Western philosophy.  Writing is seen (at once) as both a remedy and a poison via its association to 
SKDUPDNRQDZRUGWKDWµKDUERU>V@ZLWKLQLWVHOI>D@FRPSOLFLW\RIFRQWUDU\YDOXHV¶.69  Thus in one sense 
writing can be seen as a cure or beneficial remedy which aids memory and the growth of knowledge.70  
                                                          
61
 Derrida (n 44) 252.  See also 228. 
62
 %HUQDUG+DUULVRQµ¶:KLWH0\WKRORJ\5HYLVLWHG'HUULGDDQG+LV&ULWLFVRQ5HDVRQDQG5KHWRULF¶9RO
25(3) Critical Inquiry 505-534, 515 
63
 3DXOGH0DQµ7KH(SLVWHPRORJ\RI0HWDSKRU¶9RO&ULWLFDO,QTXLU\-30, 30. 
64
 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (University of Chicago 1981) 70. 
65
 ibid 112. 
66
 ibid 71-+HFDOOVLWDFRQFHSWRIµPDOOHDEOHXQLW\¶6HHDOVR 
67
 ibid   )RU DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ GLVFXVVLRQ RI 3ODWR¶V 3KDUPDF\ VHH -DFTXHV GH 9LOOH µ5HYLVLWLQJ 3ODWR¶V
3KDUPDF\¶,QWHUQDtional Journal for the Semiotics of Law (2010) 23:315-338.  
68
 3KDUPDNRQ µconstitutes the medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that links 
WKHPDPRQJWKHPVHOYHVUHYHUVHVWKHPRUPDNHVRQHVLGHFURVVRYHULQWRWKHRWKHU«7KHpharmakon is the 
PRYHPHQW WKH ORFXV DQG WKH SOD\ WKH SURGXFWLRQ RI GLIIHUHQFH « ,W KROGV LQ UHVHUYH LQ LWV XQGHFLGHG
VKDGRZDQGYLJLOWKHRSSRVLWHV«WKDWWKHSURFHVVRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQZLOOFDUYHRXW&RQWUDGLFWLRQVDQGSDLUV
of opposites are lifted from the bottom of this diacritical, differing, deferring, reserve.¶Derrida (n 64) 127. 
69
 ibid 125. 
70
 ibid 97 
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Yet writing can also be seen as a pernicious poison, making worse that which it claims to cure.71  
These non-UDWLRQDO TXDOLWLHV RI 3ODWR¶V SKLORVRSK\ KDYH EHHQ ZLGHO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG  Huizinga, for 
example, notes elements of µWKH DUFKDLF VSKHUH RI play¶ DFURVV 3ODWR¶V GLDORJXHV GHVSLWe his 
denunciation of rhetoric,72 and Goodrich also claims WKDW 3ODWR¶V GHIHQFe of philosophy appeals to 
emotion rather than reason.73 
 
Derrida returned to metaphor and related devices in the The Beast & the Sovereign, a series of lectures 
tracing the imagery of animals and beasts across a range of political philosophy texts, particularly 
those concerning sovereignty.74  He discussed political philosophy as fable; though such discourse is 
presented as separate and different to fable,75 Derrida sought to draw out its fable-OLNHRUµIDEXODU¶
qualities.  For example, noting the recurrence of the wolf across historical works, including 
mythology, The %LEOHDQG5RXVVHDX¶VSKLORVRSK\76 Derrida asked why certain political philosophers 
are compelled towards animal figures.77  One reason may be the conventions of genre which involve 
WKH XVH RI µmetaphors, metonymies or even [allegories], ..[and] animal fables¶78  Derrida thus 
SURSRVHG WKDW ZH SD\ DWWHQWLRQ WR µthe logic of political unconscious¶ ZKLFK LV LQYROYHG LQ WKHVH
DQLPDO YLVLRQV DQG QRWH WKH µV\PSWRPV >WKDW@ VKRZ XS RQ WKH VXUIDFH RI SROLWLFDO « GLVFRXUVH¶79  
Ultimately, The Beast & The Sovereign identifies further instances of philosophical models drawing 
upon metaphor and figurative, literary, non-rational devices.  Deconstruction highlights the operation 
of such metaphors and the means by which they have been disguised, thus breaking down the 
apparent distinction between philosophy and literature. 
 
Within philosophical or other texts metaphors or tropes will often have a rhetorical effect, discreetly 
EXWWUHVVLQJWKHDUJXPHQWVEHLQJPDGH µ'HUULGD¶VOLQHRIDWWDFNLVWRSLFNRXW«ORDGHGPHWDSKRUV
and show how they work to support a whole powerful structure of presuppositions.¶80  An ideal 
H[DPSOHGLVFXVVHGE\'HUULGDLV+REEHV¶Leviathan which depicts men in the lawless state of nature 
entering a social contract to found a sovereign who brings protection and order via laws that all must 
                                                          
71
 ibid 97-98; 102-3. 
72
 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens, A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Martino 2014) ch IX, esp 151.  
73
 Goodrich (n 33) 101.  See also: Lakoff & Johnson (n 12) 190. 
74
 'HUULGDFODLPVVRYHUHLJQW\LVRIWHQGHSLFWHGLQDQLPDOWHUPVµthe essence of the political and, in particular of 
the state and sovereignty has often been represented in the formless form of animal monstrosity, in the figure 
without figure of a mythological, fabulous, and non-natural monstrosity, an artificial monstrosity of an 
animal.¶-DFTXHV'HUULGDThe Beast & the Sovereign, Volume I (University of Chicago Press 2009) 25.    
75
 µ[I]n the prevalent or hegemonLF WUDGLWLRQRI WKHSROLWLFDODSROLWLFDOGLVFRXUVH«VKRXOG LQQRFDVHFRPH
XQGHUWKHFDWHJRU\RI>IDEOH@«DP\WKLFDOQDUUDWLYHZLWKRXWKLVWRULFDONQRZOHGJHDOHJHQG«LQDQ\FDVHD
fiction supposed to give something to be known¶ibid 34. 
76
 ibid First Session. 
77
 ibid 80-1. 
78
 ibid 81. 
79
 ibid 82. 
80
 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction, Theory and Practice (3rd edn, Routledge 2006) 27.   
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obey.81  Despite his denunciation of metaphor, Hobbes envisages the sovereign state created by the 
social contract as a monstrous, artificial man-made animal82 reSUHVHQWLQJ D FRS\ RI *RG¶V ZRUN.83  
+REEHV¶ H[WHQGHG PHWDSKRU VHHV VRYHUHLJQW\ DV WKH EHLQJ¶V DUWLILFLDO VRXO84 and various state 
LQVWLWXWLRQVDVFRUUHVSRQGLQJSDUWVRIWKHDUWLILFLDOERG\µThe analogistic description of the Leviathan 
IROORZV LQ WKH ERG\ RI WKH VWDWH « WKH ZKROH VWUXFWXUH RI WKH KXPDQ ERG\¶85  This metaphor is 
supplemented by other science-based imagery in the text.86  According to Derrida, the key human 
PRWLYDWLRQ WKDW XQGHUOLHV +REEHV¶ DFFRXQW RI KXPDQNLQG LV IHDU SDQLF DQG WHUURU87  His social 
contract represents men moving from one fear (of threat in the state of nature) to another (fear of the 
VRYHUHLJQ¶VSXQLVKPHQW88  7KXV IRU'HUULGD+REEHV¶/HYLDWKDQ LVXOWLPDWHO\DQ µanimal-machine 
GHVLJQHG WR FDXVH IHDU « ZKLFK UXQV RQ IHDr and reigns by fear¶89 Significantly, Derrida further 
FODLPV WKDWVXFKµIDEXODU¶GLPHQVLRQVLQ WKHUKHWRULFRISROLWLFDOSKLORVRSK\XOWLPDWHO\ LPSDFWXSRQ
real world political actions regarding matters such as warfare or terrorism.90 
 
Because of its implications for objective truth claims, and thus the very foundations of Western 
thought, deconstruction has EHHQ DFFXVHG RI GHWDFKHG UHFNOHVV QLKLOLVP RU µWH[WXDO YDQGDOLVP¶91  
However, these have been rejected as misrepresentative by numerous commentators.92  Culler, for 
instance, claims that deconstruction does not lead to destruction, but to reinterpretation or re-
inscription of the relevant binary oppositions.93  Such reinterpretation involves acknowledgement that 
the unspoken theoretical foundations of our thought systems are historically and culturally specific 
rather than universal, self-evident, objective or immovable: 
 
³The deconstructive critique reminds us that our social vision and system of 
laws are not based on human nature as it really is, but rather upon an 
interpretation of human nature, a metaphor, a privileging´94 
 
Derrida specifically made such observations in relation to the foundations of existing liberal legal 
systems.  In The Force of Law KHFODLPHGWKDWOHJDOGLVFRXUVHLVEDVHGXSRQµWheoretically weak and 
                                                          
81
 Derrida (n 74) 40-41.   
82
 ibid 26-7. 
83
 ibid 53-4.  
84
 ibid 47. 
85
 ibid 28.   
86
 Midgley notes that Hobbes adopted ideas regarding matter, particles and motion from physics.  Mary 
Midgely, The Myths We Live By (Routledge, 2011) 47-49; 71. 
87
 +REEHV¶ /HYLDWKDQ LV MXVW RQHSROLWLFDO WKHRU\ WKDW µKDV PDGH IHDURUSDQLF« DQ HVVHQWLDO DQG structural 
PDLQVSULQJRI«>EHLQJDVXEMHFWLQSROLWLFDOVRFLHW\@¶Derrida (n 74) 39. 
88
 ibid 42. 
89
 ibid 39-µSovereignty causes fear, and fear makes the sovereign¶ 
90
 ibid 35. 
91
 %DUEDUD -RKQVRQ µDeconstruction is not a form of textual vandalism designed to prove that meaning is 
impossible¶µ,QWURGXFWLRQ¶LQDerrida (n 64) xiv. 
92
 Harrison (n 62) 518-9.  
93
 Culler (n 60) 133.  See also: Johnson (n 91). 
94
 -0%DONLQµ'HFRQVWUXFWLYH3UDFWLFHDQG/HJDO7KHRU\¶<DOH/-   
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FUXGH >D[LRPV@¶ DQG WKDW LWV UHVXOWLQJ OLPLWDWLRQV KDYH µPDVVLYH DQG FRQFUHWH¶ HIIHFWV95  Yet here 
Derrida also expressly denied the charge of nihilism, arguing that deconstruction does not involve an 
abdication of questions of justice.96  Rather it requires one to consider the history, development and 
OLPLWVRIFRQFHSWVVXFKDVMXVWLFHDQGODZWRFRQVLGHUWKHDVVXPHGµYDOXHVQRUPVDQGSUHVFULSWLRQV
WKDWKDYHEHHQ«VHGLPHQWHGWKHUH¶97    
 
Fish defends anti-foundational outlooks such as rhetoric and deconstruction against classic, objectivist 
accusations.  He rejects the distinction between literal and rhetorical speech, claiming that all 
languages (legal, scientific, poetic) are innately rhetorical because they occur within inescapable 
socially constructed paradigms.98  This realisation need not entail cynicism and nihilism99 because 
ultimately, for Fish, 
 
³the radically rhetorical insight of Nietzschean/Derridean thought can do 
radical political work; becoming aware that everything is rhetorical is the 
first step in countering the power of rhetoric and liberating us from its 
force.  Only if deeply entrenched ways of thinking and acting are made the 
objects of suspLFLRQ ZLOO ZH EH DEOH µHYHQ WR imagine that life could be 
GLIIHUHQWDQGEHWWHU¶´100  
 
Derrida demonstrates that powerful metaphors can be found in unexpected places, and that despite 
appearances they can be employed for rhetorical effect remarkably effectively, prompting (perhaps 
subconscious) emotions and responses which contradict the stated ideals of the text.  The potential 
implications of such strategies for legal discourse are patent.   
 
[1.3] The Rhetorical Effects of Metaphor in Law  
 
Despite its legal origins, rhetoric is a technique or form of language that lawyers do not generally 
associate with the apolitical rationality of law.  Yet the 1980s-90s saw renewed attention in law as a 
form of rhetoric.  This interest was partly stimulated by the emerging law and literature movement 
which is not only concerned with representations of law in literature, but also reading law as 
literature.101  The latter, of particular relevance to this article, raises questions about the implicit 
                                                          
95
 -DFTXHV'HUULGD µ)RUFHRI/DZ7KH³0\VWLFDO)RXQGDWLRQRI$XWKRULW\´¶&DUGR]R/5HY-
1990, 965. 
96
 ibid   )RU DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ DQG FOHDU DFFRXQW DQG DQDO\VLV RI 'HUULGD¶V HVVD\ VHH 'RXJODV /LWRZLW]
Postmodern Philosophy & Law (University of Kansas Press 1997) ch 5. 
97
 Derrida (n 95) 953. 
98
 Fish (n 31) 486-8; 297-8. 
99
 ibid 479-481.   
100
 ibid 496. 
101
 ,DQ :DUG µ/DZ 	 /LWHUDWXUH¶ >@ YRO ,9 /DZ 	 &ULWLTXH  - 3DXO *HZLUW] µ1DUUDWLYH 	
5KHWRULFLQWKH/DZ¶LQBrooks & Gewirtz (n 54) 3-4. 
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presence of literature (or literary devices such as metaphor) in law.  Its general approach claims that 
literary theory - concerning matters such as interpretation, authorial intention, the construction of 
meaning ± affords valuable insights into legal texts despite their crucial differences to fictional 
counterparts.102  Judgments DUHWKXVXQGHUVWRRGDVDµTXDVL-OLWHUDU\JHQUH¶103 an approach exemplified 
by White, who has written:  
 
³in its hunger to connect the general with the particular, in its metaphorical 
movements, and in its constant and forced recognition of the limits of the 
mind and language, the law seemed to me a kind of poetry´104 
 
But, crucially, the focus on legal judgments as rhetoric does not adopt the derogatory sense adopted 
by Plato.  For example, White characterises rhetoric in a wider, positive sense as the study of how 
language and speech constitute our community and social world.105  This is central to his conception 
of law, viewing it DV µDQ DUW HVVHQWLDOO\ OLWHUDU\ DQG UKHWRULFDO LQ QDWXUH.¶106  Like White, Goodrich 
provides a favourable account of rhetoric as the study of public speech, a discipline that emerged with 
democratic institutions and entailed collective dialogue about community needs.107  5KHWRULF¶s notion 
of persuasion was pragmatic, and in acting to decentralise power over meaning it was µDJUHDWOHYHOOHU
RIGLVFRXUVH¶.108  Goodrich therefore advocates introducing a critical rhetoric into law as an alternative 
to WKHµDXWKRULWDULDQPRQRORJXH¶109 of dominant legal discourse which depicts itself as clear, technical 
and formal, but whose language rests on unarticulated exclusions that reflect power.110   
 
One need not subscribe WR*RRGULFKDQG:KLWH¶s defences of rhetoric, to recognise its pertinence to 
legal judgments.  That such texts are concerned (at least partly) with persuasion is reasonably 
uncontroversial.  Gewitz identifies a judicial opinion as serving three primary functions, the third of 
ZKLFKLVµWRSHUVXDGHWKHFRXUW¶VDXGLHQFHVWKDWWKHFRXUWGLGWKHULJKWWKLQJ¶111  Similarly, Levinson 
FODLPVWKDWMXGJPHQWVDUHµUKHWRULFDOSHUIRUPDQFHV¶112 ZKRVHFRJHQF\LVEDVHGXSRQERWKWKHFRXUW¶V
inherent authority and the persuasiveness of their text.  Interestingly, such views also raise the related 
question of who constitutes the audience to be persuaded.  There may be multiple potential audiences 
                                                          
102
 White (n 20) ch 1; Fish (n 316DQGIRUG/HYLQVRQµ/DZDV/LWHUDWXUH¶7H[DV/59RO 
103
 -RKQ+ROODQGHUµ/HJDO5KHWRULF¶LQBrooks & Gewirtz (n 54) 186.  See also: White (n 29FKµ7KH-XGLFLDO
2SLQLRQDQGWKH3RHP¶ 
104
 White (n 20) xii. 
105
 ibid xi. 
106
 µ>/DZ@LVPRVWXVHIXOO\DQGFRPSOHWHO\VHHQDVDEUDQFKRIUKHWRULF%XWµUKHWRULF¶«VKRXOGEHVHHQQRWDV
a failed science nor as an ignoble art of persuasion (as it often is) but as the central art by which culture and 
community are established, maintained and transformed.  This kind of rhetoric ± , FDOO LW µFRQVWLWXWLYH
UKHWRULF¶± has justice as its ultimate subject¶White (n 29) 28. 
107
 Goodrich (n 50), 175-8.   
108
 Goodrich (n 33) 95, 99, 100.   
109
 ibid 90, 99. 
110
 Goodrich (n 50) 173-5.   
111
  Gerwitz (n 54) 10. 
112
 6/HYLQVRQµ7KH5KHWRULFRI-XGLFLDO2SLQLRQ¶LQ Brooks & Gewirtz (n 54) 187. 
 13 
 
including: the losing side; opposed citizens; lawyers; fellow judges; academics; the reporting media 
and the wider populace.113  
 
Metaphors are a common trope in law and their rhetorical effect is no less operative in legal than 
philosophical discourse.  In The Metaphysics of American Law, Peller argues that socially-constructed 
metaphors pervade law.  Such metaphors are contingent in numerous ways.  First, only certain 
metaphors are adopted whilst other possible alternatives are neglected. 114  One interesting example is 
put forward by Scales who questions the preponderance of sports metaphors in law and legal 
academia, claiming they are inherently gendered, pro-rule and trivialize legal power.  Why, she asks, 
use sports metaphors rather than, for example, mothering metaphors?115  Second, metaphors highlight 
FHUWDLQ VLPLODULWLHV ZKLOVW VXSSUHVVLQJ RWKHUV  ³Representational metaphors abstract particular 
features from the otherwise thick texture of the world.  But there is no necessary reason to abstract 
some features rather than others´116  PHOOHU¶V FODLP KHUH LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK /DNRII 	 -RKQVRQ¶V
leading account of metaphor.  They claim that metaphors operate by highlighting certain similarities 
between two things, and therefore inevitably marginalising others.117  There will thus remain parts of a 
metaphor that remain unused.118  The act of metaphoric representation, then, can only ever be an 
interpretation reflecting a specific culture, context and politics.   Peller provides the salient example of 
consent in rape cases as a supporting example.  µ&RQVHQW¶is a product of interpretation, projected onto 
HYHQWV GUDZLQJ RQ µH[WHUQDO VLJQDOV¶ and ultimately based on a view of coercion founded on a 
mind/body distinction.119  
 
&UXFLDOO\DOOXGLQJSHUKDSVWR1LHW]VFKH¶VµZRUQFRLQV¶Peller claims that the metaphorical nature of 
concepts is gradually effaced and their terminology ultimately comes to be institutionalised, viewed as 
µFRPPRQVHQVH¶DQGPHUHO\UHIOHFWLQJDQDOUHDG\SUHVHQWREMHFWLYHUHDOLW\120  But Peller claims that 
rather than reflecting reality, legal metaphors actually constitute reality because they act to mediate 
and filter121 RXUH[SHULHQFHRIVRFLDOHYHQWV,QWKLVUHJDUG3HOOHU¶VFODLPLVEURDGO\FRQVLVWHQWZLWK
Lakoff & -RKQVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWV WKDW WKHKXPDQFRQFHSWXDO V\VWHP LV IXQGDPHQWDOO\PHWDSKRULFDO LQ
                                                          
113
 ibid 196-200.  See also: Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor & Reason in Judicial Opinion (Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1992) 28-34. 
114
 *DU\3HOOHUµ7KH0HWDSK\VLFVRI$PHULFDQ/DZ¶&DOLIRUQLD/DZ5HYLHZ 
115
 $QQ&6FDOHV µ6XUYLYLQJ/HJDO'H-(GXFDWLRQ$Q2XWVLGHU¶V*XLGH¶9HUPRQW/DZ5HYLHZYRO
139, p. 149-52.  
116
 Peller (n 114) 1167. 
117
 Lakoff & Johnson (n 12) Ch 3.   
118
 ibid 109 
119
 Peller (n 114) 1187-1191. 
120
 ibid 1289-90. 
121
 ibid 1155. 
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nature,122 DQG WKDW PHWDSKRUV WKXV µFUHDWH RXU UHDOLWLHV¶123  Similarly, for Peller, legal metaphors 
construct RXUµUHDOLW\¶ LQ WKHSURFHVVRI UHSUHVHQWLQJ LW124 and thus influence our actions and social 
arrangements.125  8OWLPDWHO\ OLNH SKLORVRSK\ µlegal discourse can present itself as neutral and 
determinate only to the extent that it denies its own metaphoric starting points and instead pretends to 
reflect the positive content of social relationV¶126 
 
So despite mainstream liberal understandings of law as a neutral, rational discipline, law is as reliant 
XSRQWURSHVDVOLWHUDWXUHRUSKLORVRSK\$FFRUGLQJWR*RRGULFKODZDVDQLQVWLWXWLRQUHOLHV³upon an 
unconscious reservoir of institutional connotations, metaphoric structures [and] long-term 
deployments of meaning which develop in the indefinite time of precedent.´127  Thus exploring 
figurative and symbolic devices in apparently rational, technical judgments may show that they are 
beset at some level by certain unarticulated politics, emotions or subjectivities that they explicitly 
claim to avoid.  As Douzinas states:    
 
³A concern with the figures of the legal text or with the symbolic structure 
and context of law « is a concern with a series of highly political yet 
largely unquestioned aspects of legal governance.  The critical scholar 
attends to the marginal, the peripheral or the surface precisely so as to 
recapture the politics which has escaped the text, or has been hidden 
beneath its ritual paraphernalia´128 
 
The preceding discussion in this part affords illuminating insights pertinent to the balance metaphor in 
misuse of private information caselaw.  It has highlighted the often-suppressed figurative, imaginative 
QDWXUHRIOHJDOGLVFRXUVHDQGLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHVHHVVHQWLDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUHDWRGGVZLWKODZ¶VVHOI-
presentation.  It has also revealed the unavoidable historically- and culturally-specific hierarchies that 
inform legal discourse and thus modern rights-balancing techniques.  Finally, the discussion here 
suggests that the balance metaphor does not merely represent - but may actually constitute - judicial 
understandings of rights conflicts in MPI caselaw.  It is to that caselaw that discussion now turns. 
 
 
                                                          
122
 Lakoff & Johnson (n 12) 6.  An interesting account of recent cognitive research on metaphor relevant to 
ODZ\HUV LV RXWOLQHG LQ /LQGD %HUJHU µ0HWDSKRU DQG $QDORJ\ 7KH 6XQ DQG 0RRQ RI /HJDO 3HUVXDVLRQ¶
(2013) 22 Journal of Law & Policy 147. 
123
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124
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125
 ibid ,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW3HOOHU¶VPHWDSKRUVDFURVVWKHDUWLFOHWDNHWKHIRUPRIIXQGDPHQWDOELQDU\
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 My addition.  3HWHU*RRGULFK µ-DQLanglorum, Signs, symptoms, slips and interpretatLRQ LQ ODZ¶ in Costas 
Douzinas, Peter Goodrich & Yifat Hachamovitch (eds) Politics, Postmodernity and Critical Legal Studies 
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[2] The Balance Metaphor in Misuse of Private Information   
 
 
The modern judicial technique of balancing competing rights or interests emerged in the late 1950-60s 
via a series of broadly parallel decisions by the US Supreme Court and German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.129  In his comparative study of these developments, Bomhoff argues that 
despite their shared terminology, the US and German understandings of balancing have their own 
respective intellectual origins130 and meanings specific to their national legal-jurisprudential 
cultures.131  But nonetheless, these US and German traditions have influenced contemporary 
understandings of balance, the latter playing a particularly SURPLQHQWUROHLQWKHPHWDSKRU¶VEuropean 
meaning.132  The role of µbalancH¶ in misuse of private information caselaw must be viewed against 
the backdrop of such influences. 
 
It should be noted that a number of salient metaphors populate MPI caselaw in addition to that of 
µEDODQFH¶.  Note for example the recurring vigilant media µwatchdog¶,133 an idealisation that implicitly 
µcasts the media as observer, scrutiniser and also guardian, protector of the public¶.134  Another 
highly significant metaphor in MPI cases, and indeed wider law, is the metaphor of line-drawing as 
adopted in Flitcroft135 and Browne.136  This line-drawing device, an integral feature of adjudication, 
has the effect of implying a clear, distinct divide wherever the line is situated; it envisages an issue in 
spatial terms, definitively splitting it into WZRFOHDUµDUHDV¶ or categories, where a case or set of facts 
will fall on one side or the other.  Yet, LW LV DUJXDEOH WKDW µbalance¶ is the most prominent and 
influential metaphor in MPI and its metaphorical nature has been acknowledged by leading 
commentators, though not subject to further metaphor-based scrutiny.137 
 
[2.1] µ%DODQFH¶ 
 
In misuse of private information juGJPHQWVWKHQRWLRQRIµEDODQFH¶ plays a crucial role.  The balancing 
exercise is reflected in the second of /RUG 6WH\Q¶V IRXU principles that form a key part of the new 
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 Bomhoff (n 6) 28, 72.   
130
 ibid ch 2. 
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 ibid 29-30, 238-239. 
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Vol 5(2), 220-240, 236.  
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PHWKRGRORJ\,WVWDWHV³where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense focus on 
the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is 
necessary´138  This requires a relative weighting of each right responsive to the specific facts, though 
it offers no further guidance on how the mechanics of such a weighting should proceed.  Subsequent 
ECtHR judgments, particularly Axel Springer139 and Von Hannover 2140 have provided further 
elaboration of guiding principles.   
 
7KH WHUP µEDODQFH¶ LV )UHQFK EXW KDV /DWLQ RULJLQV KDYLQJ HYROYHG IURP DQ DPDOJDPDWLRQ RI µEL¶ 
(meaning GRXEOHDQGµODQ[¶PHDQLQJDPHWDOGLVKRUSDLURIVFDOHV141  µ%DODQFH¶KDVWKHfollowing 
dictionary meanings:  
 
³>QRXQ@ (1) ETXLOLEULXP ZKDW LV QHHGHG WR SURGXFH HTXLOLEULXP «  (2) 
harmony among the parts of anything; (3) stability of body or mind; (4) 
HTXDOLW\RU MXVWSURSRUWLRQRIZHLJKWRUSRZHU« (5) the act of weighing 
two things; (6) an instrument for weighing, usu formed of two dishes or 
scales hanging from a beam supported in the middle;´142 
 
³>WUDQVLWLYH YHUE@ (7) tR VHW RU NHHS LQ HTXLOLEULXP « (8) to weigh in a 
balance; (9) to settle (eg an account);´143 
 
In PHGLDSULYDF\FDVHODZWKHWHUPµEDODQFH¶LVSULPDULO\XVHGLQWZRNH\VHQVHV)LUVWDQGIRUHPRVW
it is used as a transitive verb (definition (7)), i.e. to depict the process of balancing objects, in this case 
WKH µREMHFWV¶ EHLQJ ULJKWV  5HODWHG WR WKLV MXGJPHQWV XVH µEDODQFH¶ WR UHIHU WR WKH VSHFLILF DFW RI
weighing two things (as in definition (5)).  It is interesting to note that in each of these meanings, the 
act of balancing produces equilibrium; this is discussed further in part 2.3 below6HFRQGµEDODQFH¶LV
employed to refer to a set of scales, an instrument for weighing (as per definition (6) DQGWKHWHUP¶V
Latin origins); this use is significant and now warrants further attention. 
 
Balance: the scales metaphor 
 
$FWXDOUHIHUHQFHVWRµVFDOHV¶LQWKHZHLJKLQJSURFHVVDUHSUHVHQWacross caselaw, including Douglas,144 
Theakson,145  Campbell146 and, Prince Charles147 and ETK.148  Additionally, repeated references to 
µVFDOHV¶DUHSUHVHQWLQWKHOHDGLQJWH[WTugendhat & Christie, as in the following passage: 
                                                          
138
 Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2004] UKHL 47 [17]. 
139
 Axel Springer AG v Germany [2012] ECHR 39954/08), 
140
 Von Hannover v Germany (No 2) [2012] ECHR 40660/08. 
141
 Chambers Dictionary (10th ed, Chambers 2006) 111. 
142
 Numbers added. ibid. 
143
 Numbers added. ibid. 
144
 Douglas & Others v Hello! Ltd [2001] QB 967 (CA) [171].  Here Keene LJ, discharging an interim 
LQMXQFWLRQ VWDWHG µ:KHQ >WKH FODLPDQWV¶@ RUJDQLVHG SXEOLFLW\ LV EDODQFHG DJDLQVW WKH LPSDFW RQ WKH
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³a claim to privacy in respect of information about health or sexual life is 
likely to weigh more heavily in the scales than a claim to protect 
information which, though private in character, is intrinsically less 
intimate´149   
 
7KHUH DUH QXPHURXV RWKHU LQVWDQFHV RI MXGLFLDO XVH RI WKH WHUP µEDODQFH¶ WR LQGLFDWH µVFDOHV¶ LQ
caselaw.  In Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers the Court of Appeal stated that ensuring that 
SDUWLHVXSKHOGWKHLUGXWLHVRIFRQILGHQFHZDVµa significant element to be weighed in the balance¶150  
Elsewhere, in Hutcheson WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDOVWDWHGWKDWWKHSXEOLFGLPHQVLRQRIIDPLO\ZDVµa factor 
to be weighed in the balance¶151  $Q LGHQWLFDO XVH RI µEDODQFH¶ LQ WKH VFDOHV VHQVH LV HYLGHQW LQ
Campbell,152 CDE,153 ETK,154 WXY v Gewanter,155 AAA v Associated Newspapers156 and Rocknroll v 
News Group.157   Similarly, in Ferdinand 1LFRO-PDGHUHIHUHQFHWRµthe art 8 side of the balance¶
ODWHUVWDWLQJWKDWSXEOLFDWLRQRIDQµXQH[FHSWLRQDEOH¶SKRWRRIWKHFODLPDQWDQGDZRPDQZLWKZKRP
KHKDGDQDGXOWHURXV DIIDLU µ[did] not tip the balance¶ LQ WKH FODLPDQW¶V IDYRXU158  In each of these 
H[WUDFWVWKHPHDQLQJRIµEDODQFH¶KDVVubtly shifted, to represent a set of measuring scales.      
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
defendants of an injunction restraining publication, I have no doubt that the scales come down in this case 
against prior restraint¶ 
145
 Theakston v MGN Ltd >@(:+&>@+HUH2XVHOH\-VWDWHGµI consider that the scales would be 
likely to come down in favour of the freedom of expression of the newspaper and of the prostitutes unless it 
was clear that there was a strong case for inhibiting it.¶ 
146
 Campbell (n 133) [29].  Disagreeing with the earlLHUMXGJPHQWRI0RUODQG-/RUG1LFKROOVVWDWHGµthe judge 
seems to have put nothing into the scales¶ 
147
 Prince of Wales v Associated News >@(:+&>@ZKHUH%ODFNEXUQH-VSRNHRIµconsiderations 
that must be weighed in the scales¶ 
148
 ETK (n 133) >@µthe additional rights of children are to be placed in the scale¶ 
149
 Tugendhat & Christie, The Law of Privacy and the Media (2nd ed, Oxford 2011) 5.131.  Other references to 
µVFDOHV¶FDQEHIRXQGDW 
150
 HRH Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1776 [76]. 
151
 Hutcheson v News Group >@(:&$&LY>@LYWKHSXEOLFGLPHQVLRQRIIDPLO\µis a factor to be 
weighed in the balance¶ 
152
 Campbell (n 133).  /RUG+RSHGLVFXVVHGWKHµZHLJKW¶WREHJLYHQWR$UWFODLPLQJµAs for the other side of 
WKHEDODQFHDSHUVRQ¶V ULJKW WRSULYDF\PD\EH OLPLWHGE\ WKHSXEOLF¶V LQWHUHVW LQ NQRZLQJDERXW FHQWUDO
traits of her personality and certain aspects of her priva WH OLIH¶, at [120].  Lord Carswell also used such 
WHUPLQRORJ\VWDWLQJµ,ZRXOGQRWP\VHOIDWWHPSWWRLVRODWHZKLFK«>HOHPHQWRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSXEOLFDWLRQ@
is more harmful or tips the balance¶DW>@ 
153
 CDE and another v MGN Limited [2010] EWHC 3308 [7]. 
154
 ETK (n 126) [15] (quoting a passage from the original decision). 
155
 WXY v Gewanter >@(:+&4%>@³$QDGGLWLRQDOIDFWRUWREHZHLJKHGLQWKHEDODQFH«LVWKH
claimed public interest´ 
156
 AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 554 [55]: ³,W is not in dispute that the legitimate public 
LQWHUHVWLQWKHIDWKHU¶VFKDUDFWHULVDQLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUWREHZHLJKHGLQWKHEDODQFHDJDLQVWWKH&ODLPDQW¶V
reasonable expectation of privacy´6HHDOVR>@ 
157
 Rocknroll v News Group Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 [39]. 
158
 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 [70], [102]. 
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From these caselaw extracts, it is apparent that µEDODQFH¶ IRUPV LQ /DNRII DQG -RKQVRQ¶V WHUPV D
conventional structural metaphor expressible as ADJUDICATING RIGHTS IS BALANCING SCALES.159  
It is conventional in that it IRUPVSDUWRIRXUFXOWXUH¶VRUGLQDU\ conceptual system, as reflected by its 
widespread usage in legal ± and indeed wider political - discourse.160  Furthermore it is structural in 
nature because it allows lawyers to orient, quantify, discuss and structure rights adjudication.161  As is 
common in other structural metaphors, the balance metaphor enables this because the defining 
concept (BALANCING SCALES) is µmore clearly delineated in our experience and typically more 
concrete¶ than the defined concept (ADJUDICATING RIGHTS).162  The MPI caselaw and commentary 
indicate that privacy-free expression disputes are envisaged as BALANCING SCALES in a number of 
ways.  Disputes occur in binary terms and the opposing VLGHV DUH µbalanceG¶.  The metaphor is 
extended ZLWK IUHTXHQW UHIHUHQFHV WR WKH µZHLJKW¶RI ULJKWV UHpresenting the cogency oI HDFKVLGH¶V 
supporting arguments.  Further extension occurs with repeated references to sets of scales.  Further 
discussion in parts 2.2 and 2.3 will indicate that the structural metaphor ADJUDICATING RIGHTS IS 
BALANCING SCALES is supplemented by additional metaphors. 
 
Part 1 discussed numerous theorists who have analysed the rhetorical effect of metaphor across 
various discourses.  Informed by such literature, it is arguable that the balancing metaphor discreetly 
brings two distinct but related rhetorical advantages that will now be discussed in turn. 
 
[2.2] The Certainty of the Quantitative 
 
First, the balancing exercise connotes a seemingly objective,163 scientific164 and precise165 weighting 
SURFHVV RQH WR EH XQGHUWDNHQ LQ UHODWLRQ WR WZR REMHFWV WZR µWKLQJV¶ ZLWK D SK\VLFDO SUHVHQFH
Gauging weight is a quantitative process and this language thus gives a sense of the quantifiable166 or, 
                                                          
159
 This follows LDNRII	-RKQVRQ¶s presentational format featuring metaphors in capital text (n 12). 
160
 ibid 139. 
161
 ibid 61 (and ch 13 generally). 
162
 ibid 108-9 
163
 µThe scales affirm that the workings of justice are both objective and impartial.  The process of judgment 
must be independent of the whim of any individual; judgment is concerned with the objective weighting of 
LVVXHVLQWKHEDODQFH«WKLVREMHFWLYHVWDQGard which is reflected through law¶0DUWLQ/RXJKOLQSword & 
Scales, An Examination of the Relationship Between Law & Politics (Hart 2000) 56.  See also: Dennis Curtis 
	-XGLWK5HVQLNµ,PDJHVRI-XVWLFH¶<DOH/-YRO0DUWLQ-D\µ0XVW-XVWLFHEH%OLQG"¶
in Law & the Image, The Authority of Art & the Aesthetics of Law (ed: Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead) Uni 
of Chicago Press, 1999), Ch 1, p 21. 
164
 µThe image [of balancing] is of a highly objective process (two weights in a scale, suggesting both science 
and Blind Justice).¶'XQFDQ.HQQHG\, A Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press 1998) 148.  
165
 Loughlin (n 163) 56. 
166
 :DOGURQDOVRQRWHVWKDWµEDODQFH¶LQYROYHVµFRQQRWDWLRQVRITXDQWLW\DQGSUHFLVLRQ¶DQGHQWDLOVµTXDQWLWDWLYH
LPDJHU\¶  -HUHP\:DOGURQ µ6HFXULW\	/LEHUW\7KH ,PDJHRI%DODQFH¶ -RXUQDORI3ROLWLFDO3KLORVRSK\
vol 11(2) 2003 191, 192.  
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LQ'HUULGD¶VWHUPVWKHµFDOFXODEOH¶167  ,WLVDUJXDEO\LQIOXHQFHGE\$ULVWRWOH¶VQRWLRQRIUHFWLILFDWRU\
justice, that form of particular justice whereby a judge restores the precise status quo when an 
injustice has occurred between parties  $ULVWRWOH¶V DFFRXQW of rectificatory justice also draws upon 
quantitative imagery, viewing it in terms of unequal lines, the longer of which has its excess halved 
and transferred to the shorter.168  The likely influence of German jurisprudence should also be noted 
here.  Bomhoff traces sLPLODUµVFLHQWLIiF¶ tendencies through the works of influential German thinkers, 
for example the Interessenjurisprudenz scholars, including Heck, who viewed balance as a neutral 
method169 and later authors, such as Forsthoff, who sought to render balancing more scientific by 
structuring and formalizing it.170  A prominent contemporary manifestation of this tradition is the 
work of Alexy on balancing, optimization and proportionality.171  According to Bomhoff, the image 
conveyHGE\$OH[\¶VDFFRXQW is that of µa finely calibrated balance «where all values and interests 
can receive their exact due¶172   
 
Crucially, the balancing metaphor also acts to reify rights because it inevitably leads one to view the 
rights being balanced as tangible objects.  Such reification can be seen in MPI cases where the courts 
include the rights of additional family members in the balancing exercise.  In ETK v News Group for 
example, the Court of Appeal recognised the rights of WKH FODLPDQW¶VZLIH DQGchildren as separate 
objects with weight in themselves.173  Their aGGLWLRQWRWKHµEDODQFH¶LPSOLHG more µquantity¶, adding 
weight to WKH FODLPDQW¶V Article 8 arguments.174  The balance metaphor thus also entails the 
ontological metaphor that A RIGHT IS A PHYSICAL OBJECT OF VARIABLE WEIGHT.  Ontological 
metaphors depict experiences in terms of corporeal items which, according to Lakoff and Johnson, 
brings numerous advantages: µOnce we can identify our experiences as entities or substances, we can 
refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them ± and, by this means, reason about 
them¶175  This seems particularly apt to rights; is it possible to deal with conflicting rights detached 
from notions of balance and weight?  Yet, as discussed in part 2.2, such reifying metaphors 
necessarily entail limitation, closure and exclusion.176  
 
                                                          
167
 Derrida (n 95) 963, 965, 971.  Derrida FODLPVWKDWWKHµFDOFXODEOH¶LVWKHFRQFHUQRIODZLQFRQWUDVWWRMXVWLFH
which is incalculable.   
168
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 2009), book V, ch 4, esp 1132a-1132b. 
169
 Bomhoff (n 6) 60-64. 
170
 ibid 87-89. 
171
 For Alexy balancing is an inherently rational process that can be aided by the formation of scales of degree 
and methods of quantification.  See: ibid 195, 219; 5REHUW $OH[\ µ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO 5LJKWV %DODQFLQJ DQG
5DWLRQDOLW\¶Ratio Juris, vol 16(2) 131-140. 
172
 Emphasis added.  Bomhoff (n 6) 201. 
173
 ETK v News Group (n 133) [14]. 
174
 µI cannot agree that the harmful effect on the children cannot tip the balance¶:DUG/- ibid [18]. 
175
 Lakoff & Johnson (n 12) Ch 6 
176
 Peller (n 114) 1157-8. 
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Despite judgements drawing heavily on this quantitative metaphor, the balancing exercise involves 
MXGJHVPDNLQJTXDOLWDWLYHDVVHVVPHQWVSDUWLFXODUO\DERXWWKHVRFLDOYDOXHRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSURSRVHG
publication.177  So despite involving qualitative evaluations, MPI caselaw repeatedly draws upon the 
quantitative imagery of balancing.  For example, in Ferdinand 1LFRO-VWDWHGµI have to decide where 
the balance lies between these competing rights as an objective matter¶178  This gives the impression 
that the weighting process can be undertaken scientifically, mathematically, despite the fact that the 
Art 8/10 rights are not material objects.  Yet elsewhere in MPI discourse, there is isolated 
acknowledgement in caselaw that the balancing exercise is not a precise science.  For example in 
Campbell Lord Carswell conceded that the weighting process may lead different people to different 
conclusions179  In A v B (Flitcroft) the Court of Appeal similarly acknowledged that subjectivities and 
ambiguities may plague the process of balancing conflicting rights by stating:  
 
³We are suggesting that frequently what is required is not a technical 
approach to the law but a balancing of the facts.  The weight which should 
be attached to each relevant consideration will vary depending on the 
precise circumstances.  In many situations the balance may not point 
clearly in either direction.´180  
 
Even allowing for the fact that the Campbell and Flitcroft judgments were provided at the earliest 
stages of the emerging MPI doctrine, these passages are revealing.  The latter passage candidly 
DFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWµEDODQFLQJ¶LQWKLVcontext is actually variable, non-technical and, by implication, 
VXEMHFWLYH)XUWKHUPRUHLQµmany¶FDVHVWKHRXWFRPHZLOOEHXQFHUWDLQZLWKVFRSHIRUWKHSURFHVVWR
be legitimately conducted in numerous different ways.  This latter point is demonstrated by the split 
3:2 Law Lords decision in Campbell and the dissenting judgment of Judge Lopez Guerra in Axel 
Springer in the ECtHR)181.  This undermines the impression subtly fostered by the metaphor that the 
balancing exercise is scientific or objective in nature.  Furthermore, it indicates that the balancing 
exercise is fundamentally different in nature to the balancing of objects in scales, despite the recurrent 
use of that image; unlike theoretical, metaphysical rights balancing, using scales allows the weight of 
a particular item to be factually quantified with certainty.  Yet such mixed judicial statements also 
perhaps reflect an ambiguity inherent in the balance metaphor: are the rights are weighed with 
UHIHUHQFHWRDQµH[WHUQDO¶REMHFWLYHVFDOHRUrelative to one another?  The imagery of scales suggests 
both. 
 
 
                                                          
177
 For a discussion of this see Moosavian (n 11) 243-50. 
178
 Emphasis added.  Ferdinand (n 158) [103].   
179
 Campbell (n 133) [168]. 
180
 Flitcroft (n 135) 210 (D)-(E). 
181
 Axel Springer (n 139).  Dissenting opinion of Judge Lopez Guerra, joined by Judges Jungwiert, Jaeger, 
Villiger and Poalelungi.  
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The HQGXULQJLQIOXHQFHRIµEDODQFH¶LQPRGHUQKXPDQULJKWVGLVFRXUVH is perhaps a reflection of our 
broader political-bureaucratic culture, with its emphasis on reductive rationalities, binary ends/means 
trade-offs and social-scientific approaches to crucial community issues.182  Yet, as White argues, the 
work of lawyers is inherently creative183 and legal reasoning works by a range of methods, many of 
which are distinctly non-scientific.184  The balance metaphor in MPI is particularly paradoxical; a 
literary device that discreetly draws on the stature of science.  Yet even this quantitative, reifying 
metaphor entails a subtle rhetoric of its own, its power resting on its implicit claims to be non-
rhetorical.  In Fish¶VWHUPV µImpersonal method [e.g. of the balancing sort@« is both an illusion and 
a danger (as a kind of rhetoric it masks its rhetorical nature)¶.185 
 
Exposing the connotations of calculability and certainty sedimented in the balance metaphor 
necessarily entails facing uncertainty.  Yet, for White, this is an inevitable feature of life, and the 
lawyerly µprocess of meaning-making and community-building « requires him or her to face and 
accept the condition of radical uncertainty in which we live: uncertainty as to the meaning of words, 
uncertainty as to their effect on others, uncertainty even as to our own motivations¶186  Thus perhaps 
µEDODQFH¶DFWVDVDFRQYHQLHQWILFWLRQ which overlays an inherently creative, subjective and, to some 
extent, inexpressible interpretive activity.187  5LFRHXUIRUH[DPSOHQRWHVµthe capacity of metaphor to 
provide untranslatable information¶188  Perhaps what the term seeks to represent remains a process 
the core of which will inevitably elude attempts to articulate, categorise or systematise it.  This 
possibility is embraced by White, who writes: 
 
³In forcing us to the limits of expression and of our minds, [reading law as 
literature] is a commitment to openness, to the recognition of mystery, to the 
value of what no-one has yet found the words to say or do.  In all of this we 
must perpetually acknowledge that we have something to learn.´189 
 
 
 
                                                          
182
 White (n 29FKHVS:KLWH¶VSUHIHUUHGPHWKRGHQWDLOVµreading law as a kind of literature (as opposed, 
for example, to reading law as a kind of policy science or economics or social process)¶DW 
183
 ibid 34. 
184
 µ>2@QH UHDVRQV QRW RQO\ ZLWK µSURSRVLWLRQV¶ EXW ZLWK PHWDSKRUV DQDORJLHV JHQHUDO WUXWKV VWDWHPHQWV RI
IHHOLQJDQGDWWLWXGH«DQGRQHPRYHVQRWRQO\E\ORJLFEXWE\DVVRFLDWLRQDQGDQDORJ\DQGLPDJHE\ZKDW
seems natural and right.¶White (n 20) 12.  See also 14.  See also Murray (n 1). 
185
 My addition.  Fish (n 31) 485. 
186
 White (n 29) 39-40.  See also 128,130. 
187
 µWe require our complexity to be explicit, spelled out, and we call it an aesthetic value and a test of truth.  
But in its own way this can itself be a kind of simplemindedness ± an avoidance of the complexity that 
underlies and is evoked by some simple texts, or a denial of the importance of what matters most.¶ibid 120.  
188
 3DXO5LFRHXU µ7KH0HWDSKRULFDO3URFHVVDV&RJQLWLRQ ,PDJLQDWLRQDQG)HHOLQJ¶&ULWLFDO ,QTXLU\YRO
(1978) 143, 143.  See also, Ross (n 2) 1071-2. 
189
 White (n 29) 124.  See also: Ricoeur (n 1885LFRHXUVWDWHVWKDWµmetaphorical meaning compels us to 
explore the borderline between the verbal and non-verbal¶DW151. 
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[2.3] The Allure of Reconciliation 
 
The second advantage of µEDODQFLQJ¶ LV LWV FDSDFLW\ WR foster the moral appeal of a decision in a 
number of discreet but powerful ways.  )RU H[DPSOH µEDODQFH¶ FRQWDLQV a trace reference to the 
traditional symbol of justice; the scales.  In this sense it constitutes an image-based metaphor which 
SOD\VRQWKHYLVXDODVSHFWRIµEDODQFH¶190  Daube confirms that the symbol of the scales in decision-
making has ancient origins, with references dating back to the Egyptian Book of the Dead (circa 1400 
BC).191  This depicted the ritual judgment of each individual in the afterlife (Duat) by weighing their 
heart in a set of scales in order to judge their past conduct.192  The dHFHDVHG¶V KHDUW was weighed 
against a feather of Maat which represented order, truth and justice.  The ideal outcome was 
equilibrium; an exact balance between heart & Maat.  The balancing process entailed purification.  
The good went to paradise, the evil faced the punishment of being devoured by a hybrid crocodile-
headed beast called Ammit.  Scales as a form of judgement also feature in The Iliad, where Zeus 
consulted his golden scales to decide who would GLH LQ EDWWOH D SURFHVV WHUPHG µNHURVWDVLD¶ the 
weighing of souls.  Zeus placed keres (death spirits) in each pan and the heavier sank to Hades.193  In 
this context the scales represent death and destruction and, interestingly, there is no moral dimension 
to the judgment,194 though Huizinga identifies element of chance or play within the metaphor.195  
References to judgment via scales are also present in religious texts such as the Old Testament and the 
Koran.196  Loughlin claims that µthe imagery of the scales has assumed an almost universal 
significance¶,197 perhaps, most prominently, by virtue of the scales held by Lady Justice in legal 
iconography.198  These brief historical examples indicate that though the subject matter being weighed 
has changed over the millennia to reflect the ideals and culture of the day, the image of the set of 
scales representing RU µUH-SUHVHQWLQJ¶ judgment has endured.  Ancient mystic death spirits and 
feathers of truth are now replaced with twenty-first century legal rights. 
                                                          
190
 For a really interesting discussion of the dominance of visual metaphors in legal discourse as a reflection of 
dominant power, and the more recent shift towards aural metaphors associated with challenging that power, 
VHH %HUQDUG - +LEELWWV µ0DNLQJ Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of 
$PHULFDQ/HJDO'LVFRXUVH¶&DUGR]R/DZ5HYLHZ 
191
 'DYLG'DXEHµ7KH6FDOHVRI-XVWLFH¶-XGLFLDO5HYLHZYRO-120.  Though references to 
the process of weighing the heart on scales have been found in the Coffin Texts, circa 19th C BC.  John 
Taylor (ed), Journey Through the Afterlife, Ancient Egyptian Book of the Dead (2010) British Museum 
Press, 205. 
192
 The process is detailed in Taylor (n 191) ch 9 (Judgment).  
193
 Homer, The Iliad (Penguin Classics 1965), pp146-7; 310; 359-60; 402, 
194
 %&'LHWULFKµ7KH-XGJPHQWRI=HXV¶LQRheinisches Museum fur Philiologie, Nue Foge, 107 Bd 2 H (1964) 
97-125, at p 125 
195
 Huizinga (n 72) 79.   
196
 Daube (n 191) 113-120. 
197
 Loughlin (n 163) 56. 
198
 For a discussion of the image of Lady Justice, Justitia, through history see Curtis & Resnik (n 163).  This 
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7KRXJK µEDODQFH¶ LQ03, MXGJHPHQWV UHIHUV WR HLWKHU WKHSURFHVV RIEDODQFLQJ RU D VHW RI VFDOHV D
further meaning becomes significant in this context; balance as equilibrium and harmony (as in the 
dictionary definitions (1)-7KHVHDGGLWLRQDOPHDQLQJVRIµEDODQFH¶UHIHUWRDVWDWHRIDIIDLUVDQG
in the context of MPI caselaw, imply that equilibrium, an optimum outcome, is capable of being 
achieved.  In this sense, the scales form a recurring figurative device conveying an implicit message; 
that via the balancing exercise order is achieved, equilibrium restored.  Deconstructive readings 
consider WKH HIIHFW RI µWUDFHV¶ RI RWKHU PHDQLQJV ZLWKLQ WHUPV HPSOR\HG WKH LPSOLFLW PHDQLQJV RI
µEDODQFH¶LQLWVRWKHUVHQVHVHJVFDOHVRUGHUHTXLOLEULXPKDUPRQ\VWDELOLW\199 are also at play in 
media privacy judgments and their influence cannot be discounted.200  -XGLFLDOXVHRIµEDODQFH¶GUDZV
silently upon these meanings, thus leaving an accretion of subconscious clues or indicators which 
cumulatively instil the impression that the conflict between Arts 8 & 10 can be neatly solved.  This is 
supported by select judicial (and academic) comments which seem to indicate that the Art 8/10 
conflict can be enigmatically ameliorated by going through the balancing process.  For example, in 
Campbell Lord Hoffmann DVNHG µHow are they to be reconciled in a particular case?¶201 He 
furthermore appeared to suggest that if one understood the case in terms of the HRA, such opposition 
was not actually present: 
 
³If one takes this approach [of balancing privacy and free expression], 
there often is no real conflict´202 
 
This particularly interesting statement seems to claim that through the HRA lens the privacy-free 
expression conflict disappears, or (perhaps) that it was never there in the first place.  Lord Hoffmann¶V
comment may have been influenced by Fenwick and Phillipson¶VDUJXPHQWVthat justifications for free 
expression can actually be employed to undermine and restrict privacy-invading speech.  The authors 
claim, µDWWKHOHYHORISULQFLSOH«WKHULJKWVWRIUHHGRPRIVSHHFKDQGWRSULYDF\DUHLQPDQ\UHVSHFWV
µmutually supportive¶203 and µit will only be in a fairly narrow category of cases that any real conflict 
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will arise¶.204  In other words, properly conceived, there is actually no conflict between privacy and 
free expression at the level of principle in most cases; true conflict only occurs in cases involving 
privacy-invading speech which actually serves the public interest.  Waldron makes a similar Dworkin-
influenced point.  He proposes viewing interULJKWFRQIOLFWVYLDWKHµLQWHUQDOUHODWLRQ¶EHWZHHQULJKWV
rather than as a simple clash of interests.  7DNLQJ WKLV µmore systemic¶ approach, argues Waldron, 
allows free expression conflicts to be viewed in a way which relates disputes back to the animating 
principles for the rights in question.  For example, a dispute between two conflicting free expression 
DUJXPHQWVVKRXOGEHYLHZHGµLQ WHUPVRIHDFKSHUVRQ¶V LQWHUHVW LQSDUWLFLSDWLQJRQHTXDO WHUPV LQD 
IRUPRISXEOLF OLIH LQZKLFKDOOPD\VSHDN WKHLUPLQGV¶205  In doing so, ³What looked like a brute 
confrontation between two rival LQWHUHVWV « turns out to be resolved by considering the internal 
relation that obtains between our understanding of the respective rights claims´206  These arguments 
display marked similarities to earlier German balancing discourse which reflected a constitutional 
culture that emphasised the unification and harmonisation of conflicting values or interests;207 that 
µfavoured synthesis and reconciliation over contestation and conflict.¶208 Crucially, this culture 
entailed the view that such conflicts µcould be reframed so as to lessen their impact, or even so as to 
overcome them entirely.¶209  The approaches of Lord Hoffmann, Fenwick, Phillipson and Waldron all 
underplay the degree of conflict in MPI cases; they foster the impression that the Art 8/10 conflict 
might prima facie look intractable and brutal, but it is ultimately underpinned by coherent, 
harmonious principles.  Yet it must be remembered that this coherence is created (or rather imposed) 
by the interpretation, a constructive interpretation.210  At the level of abstract value the authors are 
selecting one particular conception of free expression from many, 211 and one particular conception 
of privacy from many, in order to find them mutually supportive.  This choice, though certainly 
justifiable, is also eminently contestable.  An alternative view is that the µEUXWHFRQIURQWDWLRQ¶between 
Arts 8 & 10 also inescapably occurs at the level of principle.  What judgments provide is certainly a 
resolution, but it is arguably not one that successfully eradicates the conflict between Arts 8/10 at a 
more fundamental level.  Instead the resolution rests on merely one interpretation that has been 
preferenced over many other possible interpretations, and as such it represents a political choice.   
 
7KH HIILFDF\ RI µEDODQFLQJ¶ DV D SUHFLVH WHFKQLTXH LV TXHVWLRQHG E\ )UXJ LQ KLV GHFRQVWUXction of 
bureaucratic models in American law.  He FRQVLGHUVWZRMXGLFLDOUHYLHZFDVHVLQYROYLQJµthe modern 
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MXGLFLDOWHFKQLTXHRI³EDODQFLQJ´¶ZKHUHFRXUWVµ³ZHLJK´WKHLQWHUHVWVWRGHWHUPLQHZKLFKLVWKHPRVW
LPSRUWDQW´212  He claims that such balancing fuQFWLRQV DV D UHDVVXULQJ µDEVWUDFWLRQ RU UHLILFDWLRQ¶
EHFDXVHLWLQGLFDWHVWKDWµWHQVLRQV¶EHWZHHQLVVXHVFDQEHUHVROYHG%XWLQIDFWWKHWHFKQLTXHFDQRQO\
fluctuate between two opposing policy aims based upon questionable distinctions.  Frug claims that 
once this is acknowledged, ³WKH image of judicial balancing loses its power to persuade´213  Such 
critique is equally applicable to MPI caselaw which also, despite its claims, demonstrates an inability 
to reconcile rather than simply preference one of two particular rights in any given case.     
 
Mainstream comments indicating that adjudication within the HRA framework can fully solve 
disputes and somehow render Arts 8 & 10 (for the most part) compatible should be questioned.  Can 
the balancing exercise provide reconciliation per se if it must ultimately rest on the privileging of one 
of the rights in any given circumstances?  By the end of the adjudicative process in each case the Art 
8/10 rights will have been situated in a temporary hierarchy.  Eady J in Mosley stated that the 
EDODQFLQJ H[HUFLVH ZDV D PDWWHU RI µdetermin[ing] which [right] should take precedence in the 
particular circumstances¶214  In Hutcheson (CA) Gross LJ quoted the following passage by Posner: 
³when cases are difficult to decide it is usually because the decision must strike a balance between 
two legitimate interests, one of which must give way´215 i.e. be subjugated.  Both of these statements 
acknowledge that one right will, or indeed must, be privileged over the other.  So from a starting point 
of equality, one right must be prioritised or viewed as hierarchically superior in that case; thus the 
balancing exercise inevitably results in an imbalance.  This ultimate imbalance entails a further 
orientational metaphor which fosters the understanding of experiences in spatial terms.216  Lakoff and 
Johnson identify up/down as a crucial metaphor that pervades human WKRXJKW ZLWK µXp¶ EHLQJ 
associated with positive experiences (happy, conscious, in control, more) DQGµdown¶ with negative 
(sad, unconscious, under control, less).217  In the MPI balancing exercise, the successful litigant will 
be the party whose right is the weightiest.  The imbalance represents victory for the party whose scale 
LVµGRZQ¶LQdirect contrast to the common tendency of up/down orientations.  This ideal outcome of 
WKH EDODQFLQJ H[HUFLVH FDQ DOVR EH FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK =HXV¶ JROGHQ VFDOHV ZKHUH µGRZQ¶ UHSUHsented 
destruction) and with the Egyptian weighing of souls (where equilibrium was the ideal).  
 
6RXOWLPDWHO\µEDODQFH¶FRQVWLWXWHVDGLVJXLVHGPHWDSKRULFDOGHYLFHWKDWKDVNH\EHQHILFLDOUKHWRULFDO
effects in MPI judgments.  It evokes ideals and draws upon a reassuring cluster of properties (order, 
equality, equilibrium etc.) that are inconsistent with the methods of reasoning employed (which 
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involve conflict, privileging, imbalance etc.).  The balance metaphor instils a sense of elegance, 
justice and thus confidence in the process.  In this sense, perhaps the balancing exercise merely 
conceals or XQGHUSOD\V WKH FRQIOLFW  3HUKDSV LWV µ³UHVROXWLRQV´ are achieved only by sleight of 
hand¶218 RULQ5RVHQIHOG¶VWHUPVE\GLVWRUWLRQDQGVXSSUHVVLRQ219  7KHUKHWRULFRIµEDODQFH¶FDQQRW
truly resolve; it can only justify the imposed legal outcome, UHIOHFWLQJ *RRGULFK¶V FODLP WKDW ³The 
telos [end goal] of rhetorical speech is victory rather than cure´220  Yet herein lies a vital ambiguity 
at the heart of the balance metaphor.  Alongside its connotations of moral appeal and equilibrium 
balance simultaneously represents the inescapably binary nature of judicial decisions.221  For Daube 
WKH VFDOHV H[SUHVV µa deep-rooted tendency to see no shades between black and white, to admit no 
degrees of right and wrong, to allow no distribution of loss and gain among several litigants, to send 
a party away either victorious or defeated¶222  In the end, legal disputes necessitate an inevitable 
outcome RU µDQVZHU¶ that judgment must provide; for Loughlin this is a crucial connotation of the 
scales imagery.223 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The balancing of Articles 8 & 10 is an integral part of MPI caselDZDQGWKHµEDODQFH¶PHWDSKRUIXOILOV
a discreet but crucial persuasive role in two ways.  First, it marginalises the non-rational, 
inexpressible, even mysterious, aspects of judicial rights-balancing and constructs the process by 
emphasising the quantifiable, concrete properties RI µEDODQFLQJ¶ rights.  Second, it simultaneously 
highlights and mitigates the zero-sum outcome of litigation.  In doing so, µEDODQFH¶transgresses the 
implicit divides between the rational and the imaginative, the quantifiable and unquantifiable, 
objective and subjective.  It forms an important rhetorical device that benefits each individual 
judgment, the institution of law more generally and, in turn, parties or interests the law may tend to 
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favour.  This is significant in light of the wider influence of the balance metaphor beyond media-
privacy disputes, particularly in in counter-terrorism discourse for example.224  
 
This article does not claim that the subjugation of either privacy or free expression in particular cases 
LV D µEDG WKLQJ¶per se.  :DOGURQGHIHQGV µULJKWV WUDGH-RIIV¶RI WKH VRUt in MPI caselaw.  His quite 
reasonable point is that moral conflicts between parties are an unavoidable IDFWDQG³it is important 
not to saddle the proponent of [rights] trade-offs with responsibility for the actual existence of moral 
FRQIOLFWV « >$@ KDUG FKRLFH KDV WR EH PDGH RQ DQ\ DFFRXQW DQG WKH RQO\ ZD\ RI PLWLJDWLQJ LWV
hardness is to diminish the concern we feel about one or both of the options.  It is not the fault of the 
theorist [or presumably judge] who proposes trade-offs´225  This article does not VHHNWRµEODPHWKH
MXGJH¶ FKDUJHG ZLWK GHFLGLQJ WKH FDVH DV LW FRPHV EHIRUH WKHP but it does use MPI caselaw to 
question more generally ODZ¶Vnarrative about itself.  It also invites us to become more attuned to the 
presence and influence of metaphors across legal discourse more generally, and the paradoxes they 
may both express and obscure.226  $V5RVVFODLPVµwe cannot stay in the shelter of our unexamined 
metaphors¶227 
 
Judicial reference to balance and scales is a recurring metaphor in MPI caselaw.  Again, this is not a 
criticism per se; metaphors such as this are an inherent part of human thought, and the notion of 
balance and its associated qualities are intuitively appealing ideals.  But nevertheless we should not 
necessarily DFFHSW µEDODQFH¶ DV DQ DFFXUDWH representation of what occurs in these judgments, or 
indeed assume that the process is fully representable; perhaps the precise instance of balance must 
always remain in the sphere of play, eluding rationalisation, classification and articulation.  Rather 
than precisely gauging the exact weight of individual rights and creating equilibrium and order, the 
judgments entail political choices where certain values are suppressed at the expense of others, and 
imbalance inevitably results.  Deconstructive interpretation de-mythicizes the balancing metaphor and 
warns us not to assume that equilibrium is ultimately achieved via the balancing process.  It disputes 
the impression that an intractable inter-right conflict can be made to conveniently disappear, or 
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interpreted away.  So, despite the rational, technical language of MPI caselaw, it engages in 
XQDYRLGDEOHµWH[WXDOYLROHQFH¶228 even where the results may be justifiable or morally appealing. 
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